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Abstract  
 
This study aims to analyze the effect of Quality of Financial Reporting and 
Tax Incentives on Corporate Investment Efficiency with Good Corporate 
Governance as a Moderating Variable. The sampling method that used was 
purposive sampling method. The independent variables are Quality of 
Financial Reporting and Tax Incentives. Then the dependent variable is 
Corporate Investment Efficiency. The moderating variable is Good Corporate 
Governance. The population in this study are manufacturing companies which 
are listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange as long as in 2013-2017. The 
results of the study showed that the Quality of Financial Reporting and Tax 
Incentives did not effect the Corporate Investment Efficiency. Good Corporate 
Governance has a negative effect on Corporate Investment Efficiency. Good 
Corporate Governance is able to strengthen the influence of Quality of 
Financial Reporting on Corporate Investment Efficiency. Furthermore, Good 
Corporate Governance is not able to strengthen the Influence of Tax Incentives 
on Corporate Investment Efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
Efficiency is an action to use resources appropriately, there is no waste of existing resources. Investment 
efficiency is the optimal investment level of the company, where the investment is a type of investment that is 
profitable for the company. An investment is expected to provide positive added value, in the sense that the 
present value of cash flow that will be produced in the future is greater than the costs (Finnerty & Emery, 
2004). Financial statements are one of the factors that influence investment activities, useful for internal and 
external parties. Through good quality of financial reporting, information asymmetry between shareholders 
and management will be reduced so that investment activities can run more efficiently. The model of state 
budgetting is currently depending on tax revenue, which means that our taxes are the foundation of national 
economic resilience (Sitorus, 2018). To achieve efficiency, investment must be carried out according to needs. 
Investment will be efficient if the company avoids overinvestment and underinvestment (Hope & Thomas, 
2008). 
The development of investment in Indonesia is quite good. The Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) 
published quarterly investment realization data for domestic investment (PMDN) and foreign investment 
(PMA), from October to December 2017 which reached a figure of Rp 179.6 trillion, an increase of 12.7% from 
the period the same in 2016 amounted to Rp. 159.4 trillion. Investment realization in 2016 amounted to Rp. 
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159.4 trillion or an increase of 9.6% from 2015 whose investment realization value was Rp. 145.4 trillion 
(www.bkpm.go.id). The success of raising investment value in Indonesia in 2016 still needs to be watched out, 
because World Bank data in 2016 shows that Indonesia is ranked 91 in the ease of doing business, while 
Vietnam is in position 82 and Thailand in number 46 and number one position in ASEAN occupied by 
Singapore which is also the best in Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile, Indonesia is only better than the Philippines, 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. This is a threat for Indonesia to improve the system and policies that can 
attract investment in Indonesia. This proves the success of the government to increase the amount of 
investment in Indonesia through various policies taken. 
Several studies have been conducted regarding the relationship between quality of financial reporting and 
investment efficiency. Verdi (2006) study found that quality of financial reporting negatively associated both 
overinvestment and underinvestment. Managers must be able to read the right investment opportunities for 
the company. Previous research found that companies with good quality of financial reporting will produce 
more efficient investments (Biddle & Hilary, 2006). In addition to quality of financial reporting, another 
mechanism that also plays a role in reducing information asymmetry is corporate governance (Widiarno, 
2012). Good Corporate Governance is another non-financial factor which is currently widely considered by 
investors in evaluating a company. Good GCG implementation that follows the applicable regulations will 
make investors respond positively to the company's performance and increase the company's market price 
(Tambun, Sitorus, Panjaitan, & Hardiah, 2017). The survey that has been conducted shows that the value 
given to companies in Indonesia for the implementation of GCG is still low, compared to other Asian countries 
(Nainggolan, 2017). 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Agency problem was initially explored by Ross (1973) while detailed theoretical exploration of agency 
theory was first stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentioning the managers of a company as "agents" and 
"principal" shareholders. Agency theory arises because of the relationship between managers and shareholders 
in which there are differences in interests between them. This difference of interest gives rise to information 
asymmetry. Information asymmetry is the difference in information obtained between managers and 
shareholders. Information asymmetry between companies and suppliers of capital can reduce investment 
efficiency. According to Scoot (2009) there are two kinds of information asymmetry, namely: 
1. Adverse selection, namely that managers and other insiders usually know more about the condition and 
prospects of the company than outside investors. And facts that might influence the decisions that will be 
made by the shareholders are not conveyed to the shareholders. 
2. Moral hazard, namely that activities carried out by a manager are not entirely known by shareholders 
and lenders. So that managers can take action beyond the knowledge of shareholders who violate the contract 
and actually ethically or norms may not be feasible. 
The emergence of moral hazard and adverse selection problems can encourage over-investment and 
under-investment. Companies with overinvestment problems in general are companies that are at the mature 
stage with slow growth rates (slow growth), and have assets in place and high free cash flow. 
Underinvestment conditions arise when companies face investment opportunities that require the use of large 
amounts of debt, without guaranteed payment of sufficient debt (free cash flow). Companies with high levels of 
leverage will tend to experience these conditions. If the company is unable to realize the investment as 
expected, the company must look for additional funding alternatives (Januardi & Afrianto, 2017). 
 
2.1. Effect of Quality of Financial Reporting on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
The financial statements aim to provide information about the financial position, financial performance, 
and cash flow of the entity that is beneficial to most report users in making economic decisions. Quality of 
financial reporting in this case is used as a basis for consideration by investors in determining the right 
investment decisions, so that the investments made will be efficient. The higher the quality of financial 
reporting, the more firm information is reflected in the financial statements. Research conducted by 
Rahmawati and Harto (2014) whose research results show that quality of financial reporting has a positive 
influence on investment efficiency. According to Ahuja and Novelli (2017) if there is an overinvestment, the 
company can reduce investment if the financial statements have been presented with quality. The 
overinvestment condition illustrates that the amount of investment is made, but the company only gets a little 
profit. Efficient investment activities can be increased if, between quality of financial reporting and investment 
efficiency is positively related (Lai, Liu, & Wang, 2014). Meanwhile according to Lara, Osma, and Penalva 
(2015) there is no influence between quality of financial reporting on investment efficiency. Research by 
Handayani, Siregar, and Tresnaningsih (2016) shows that quality of financial reporting can reduce information 
differences, thereby reducing investment inefficiencies. Based on the results of previous studies which mostly 
have a positive effect, the first hypothesis can be drawn, H1: Quality of financial reporting has a positive effect 
on Corporate Investment Efficiency. 
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2.2. Effect of Tax Incentives on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
Tax as the main source of state revenue has a very important and strategic role for fulfilling the financing 
needs of the State Budget. One function of this regular tax is the existence of a tax incentive policy that is 
expected to attract investment. The use of tax incentives and tax exemptions is very much done in developing 
countries. Many developing countries use tax incentives to promote investment. The findings of Klemm and 
Van Parys (2012) that the tax holiday is only effective in some cases that can be confirmed. Lumbantobing 
(2008) conducted a study that showed that the incentive tax policy was not significantly related to climate 
investment of foreign investment companies in the textile industry in Indonesia. Rego and Wilson (2012) 
examined the impact of income tax incentives on foreign capital investment using macroeconomic data 
sourced from secondary data and descriptive statistical analysis with comparative evaluation methods. The 
results of the study indicate that the provision of income tax incentives does not have a significant impact on 
foreign capital investment or it can be said that income tax incentives are not a major factor in investment 
decisions. In addition to the above research, the tax impact on investment was also examined using a sectoral 
project evaluation approach. One of the studies that applied this approach was carried out by Armstrong, 
Blouin, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2015). The study linked the impact of tax system reforms to investments in 
the geothermal sector. The conclusion of the study is that although changes in tax regulations provide 
incentives in the form of decreasing the amount of income tax rates, it cannot improve the project economy 
optimally because some tax incentives on old regulations include depreciation or depreciation methods and 
investment allowances replaced or eliminated. From the above statement the second hypothesis can be drawn, 
H2: Tax Incentives has a positive effect on Corporate Investment Efficiency. 
 
2.3. Effect of Good Corporate Governance on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
The Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) defines GCG as a set of rules that regulate 
relations between holders, managers (managers) of companies, creditors, governments, employees, and other 
internal and external stakeholders related to their rights and obligations or in other words a system that 
controls the company. Good corporate mechanisms are audit committees, independent commissioners, 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership. From several previous studies, such as Houcine (2013) and 
Zheka (2003) found several factors that can affect companies to be able to invest efficiently, including: the size 
of the audit committee, independent board of commissioners, managerial ownership, and institutional 
ownership. The same thing was expressed by Drobetz and Fix (2003) who found evidence in his research that 
companies with a high level of corporate governance can produce good performance (high tobins Q). 
According to other studies conducted by Aluchna (2009) there was no direct relationship between these two 
variables. That way, corporate governance is expected to have an influence on the efficiency of corporate 
investment. From the above statement, the third hypothesis can be drawn, H3: Good Corporate Governance 
has a positive effect on Corporate Investment Efficiency. 
 
2.4. Moderation of Good Corporate Governance on the Effect of Quality of Financial Reporting on Corporate Investment 
Efficiency 
Good Corporate Governance is a concept that emphasizes the importance of the rights of shareholders to 
obtain information correctly, accurately and on time and the company's obligation to accurately, timely and 
transparently disclose all information on company performance, ownership and stakeholders. Research by 
Bachrach and Farrell (2014) testing the quality of financial reporting with economic determinants and 
consequences, testing the determinants of earnings quality shows that sales volatility factors, company 
performance and industry classification are positively related to quality of financial reporting factorial. Lestari 
and Priyadi (2016) found that almost all variables had a significant effect on quality of financial reporting 
except growth, leverage and size that did not have a significant effect on the company's quality of financial 
reporting. Oktadella (2011) shows the results that institutional ownership, audit committees, and independent 
commissioners have a positive and significant influence on the integrity of financial statements while 
managerial ownership variables have a negative and not significant influence on the integrity of financial 
statements. According to Heenetigala and Armstrong (2011) Good Corporate Governance is very effective in 
ensuring that the interests of stakeholders are protected. Accurate quality of financial reporting supported by 
the implementation of Good Corporate Governance, is expected to increase investor confidence in the quality 
of financial reporting so that investment activities in a company will run well and maximally. From the above 
statement, the fourth hypothesis can be drawn, H4: Good Corporate Governance strengthens the influence of 
Quality of financial reporting on Corporate Investment Efficiency. 
 
2.5. Moderation of Good Corporate Governance on the Effect of Tax Incentives on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
Corporate governance is used as a basis, guideline or value for commissioners, management, directors and 
employees in carrying out company operations so that the direction of the company is clear. The existence of 
corporate governance encourages management to behave in the interests of the company rather than its own 
interests. In accordance with agency theory in the company there are company owners and management as 
executors of company activities. Often over time there are differences in interests between shareholders and 
Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, 2019, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 27-35 
 
30 
management (Pratiwi, 2016). Hanum and Zulaikha (2013) explain that with the existence of independent 
commissioners (supervisors) in every formulation of corporate strategy carried out by the board of 
commissioners (supervisors) and company management (decision makers) and stakeholders will provide 
guarantees of effective and efficient results including on planning policies taxes that affect the size of the 
company's effective tax rate. 
Mahenthrian and Kasipillai (2014) study explains that tax planning requires professional skills and 
expertise, and the board of a large number of board of commissioners can influence company access to the 
human resource capabilities needed. According to Bulutoding (2016) the company's stock price is high, the 
welfare of its shareholders is also high, and vice versa, which gives effect to the company's investment, more 
effective and efficient. From the statement above, we can draw the fifth hypothesis, H5: Good Corporate 
Governance strengthens the influence of Tax Incentives on Corporate Investment Efficiency. 
 
3. Research Methods 
3.1. Population and Samples 
The population in this study were all manufactur companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2013-2017. Determination of samples in this study was carried out by purposive sampling method. Purposive 
sampling is a sampling method based on certain criteria. There are criteria that are used as follows: Companies 
that are used are manufacturing companies that are listed on the Indonesian stock exchange in 2013-2017. 
Companies that have audited financial statements and published in full. Companies that use Rupiah in financial 
statements. Companies that have data relating to research variables and are available in full. Companies that 
did not suffer losses during 2013 - 2017. 
 
3.2. Operational Definition and Variable Measurement 
The dependent variable in this study is Corporate Investment Efficiency. The investment made by the 
company must be in accordance with the needs and in accordance with what is expected by the company so as 
to create investment efficiency. According to Richardson (2006) to measure Corporate Investment Efficiency 
where Sales Growth = period sales growth t. 
Invit = β0 + β1 * Sales Growth i,t 
The first independent variable is Quality of financial reporting. According to Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) 
quality of financial reporting relates to the overall performance of a company that is reflected in company 
profits. Information on financial reporting is said to be high (quality) if the current year's profit can be a good 
indicator of future company profits. The quality of financial reporting variable is proxied by accrual quality. 
To be able to measure the value of the accrual, this study will follow the latest accrual measurement model 
conducted by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) with the following formula: 
TAi,t = α0 + α1[1/ ASSETSi,t-1] + α2ΔSALESi,t + α3PPEi,t + α4ROAi,t (or i,t-1) + εi,t 
 
Information: 
TAi, t = size regarding total company accrual i in year t 
ALSALESI, t = change in the size of sales of company i in year t 
PPEi, t = net value of total fixed assets owned by company i in year t 
ROAi, t or i, t-1 = performance measurement derived from the return on assets. 
ASSETS, t = the total value of the company's assets 
The second independent variable is Tax Incentives. Tax incentives are a form of facilities provided by the 
government to taxpayers (Darmadi, 2013). Tax incentives in this study are proxied by using tax planning, 
namely the efforts made by managers to minimize corporate tax burden in the current and future years. Tax 
planning in this study was calculated using the formula Midiasuty, Eddy, Madani, and Rahmi (2015): 
TAXPLAN =  
 
Information: 
TAXPLAN: Tax planning 
PTI: Pre-tax income 
CTE: Current portion of total tax expense (current tax expense) 
TA: Total assets 
The moderating variable in this study is Good Corporate Governance. The Forum for Corporate 
Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) (2001) defines GCG as a set of rules that regulate relations between holders, 
managers (managers) of companies, creditors, governments, employees, and other internal and external 
stakeholders related to rights and their obligations or in other words a system that controls the company. The 
good corporate governance mechanism in this study is an independent commissioner. Independent board of 
commissioners is a body in a company that usually consists of independent board members from outside the 
company who function to assess the company's performance broadly and overall (Putra, 2012). 
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Independent Commissioner =
 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Descriptive statistics try to give a description or description of a data derived from a sample, which can be 
seen from the average (mean), standard deviation (measure of the distance of each value to the mean), variance, 
maximum and minimum (Ghozali, 2016).
  
3.4. Classic Assumption Test 
The normality test aims to determine whether the disturbing variable regression model has a normal 
distribution. The normality test used in this study is the Shapiro Wilk Test using a significance level of 5% if 
p-value <0.05, the data is not normally distributed (Ghozali, 2016). Multicollinearity Aims to test whether in 
the regression analysis model there is a correlation between independent variables. The testing criteria are as 
follows: if the tolerance value is ≤ 0.10 or VIF value ≥ 10, then multicollinearity occurs.  
However, if the tolerance value is ≥ 0.10 or VIF value ≤ 10, multicollinearity does not occur. 
Heteroscedasticity test aims to test in the regression model the occurrence of variance or residual inequality 
from one another observation observation. If the residual variance from one observation to another 
observation remains, it is called homoskedasticity and if it is different it is called heteroskedacity (Ghozali, 
2016). 
 
3.5. Hypothesis Testing 
Testing the partial regression coefficient (Test - t), basically shows how far the influence of one 
explanatory variable or individually independent (partial) on the dependent variable. The decision criteria are 
as follows: (1) If t count> t table then the independent variables partially influence the dependent variable 
partially.  
If t count <t table then the independent variable i partially does not affect the dependent variable. Or (2) If 
P value <α 0.05, H0 is rejected, meaning that the independent variable has a significant effect on the 
dependent variable. If P value α α 0.05 then H0 is accepted, meaning that the independent variable has no 
significant effect on the dependent variable (Ghozali, 2016). 
 
4. Research Result 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics Descriptives used to process data are mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation, which 
are calculated from each tested variable consisting of quality reporting, tax incentives, corporate investment 
efficiency and good corporate governance. The test was conducted on manufacturing companies with a total of 
145 samples taken from 29 companies during the period 2013-2017. 
 
Table-1. Result of Descriptive Statistics. 
Variabel Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Observations 
qfr overall 
between 
within 
29.06932 1.742745 
1.752659   
.2251034 
22.74 
22.9908 
28.27712 
31.887 
31.626 
29.68032 
N =       145 
n =         29 
T =           5 
ti overall 
between 
within 
3.845904 20.17506 
20.34733 
2.125906 
-.001 
.0018 
-17.1611 
119.967 
109.641 
14.1719 
N =       145 
n =         29 
T =           5 
cie overall 
between 
within 
25.18215 1.686227 
1.28302 
1.114875 
20.107 
23.26 
21.70375 
29.238 
28.1688 
27.43175 
N =       145 
n =         29 
T =           5 
gcg overall 
between 
within 
.405669 .1631924 
.1567526 
.0523729 
.167 
.167 
.122069 
1 
1 
.900069 
N =       145 
n =         29 
T =           5 
gcgqfr overall 
between 
within 
11.79294 4.758043 
4.586487 
1.478997 
4.979 
5.0212 
3.750545 
28.463 
28.1142 
2581455 
N =       145 
n =         29 
T =           5 
gcgti overall 
between 
within 
1.538234 8.070082 
8.138996 
.8503297 
0 
.0012 
-6.864366 
47.987 
43.8566 
5.668635 
N =       145 
n =         29 
T =           5 
                         Source: Results of stata data processing, 2019. 
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the corporate investment efficiency research variables having an 
average of 25.18215, with a minimum value of 20.107 and a maximum of 29.238. The standard deviation for 
this variable is 1.686227, this can be interpreted that the deviation for this variable is 1.686227. Quality of 
financial reporting has an average of 29,06932, with a minimum value of 22,74 and a maximum of 31,887. The 
standard deviation for this variable is 1.742745, this can be interpreted that the deviation for this variable is 
1.742745. Tax incentives have an average of 3.845904, with a minimum value of -0.001 and a maximum of 
119.967.  
The standard deviation for this variable is 20,17506, this can be interpreted that the deviation for this 
variable is 20,17506. Good corporate governance has an average of 0.405669, with a minimum value of 0.167 
and a maximum of 1. The standard deviation for this variable is 0.1631924, this can be interpreted that the 
deviation for this variable is 0.1631924. 
  
4.2. Hypothesis Testing 
Testing the hypothesis in this study is done by multiple linear regression analysis aims to calculate the 
magnitude of the influence between the independent variables namely Quality of financial reporting (X1), Tax 
incentives (X2), on the dependent variable Corporate Investment efficiency (Y), with moderation of Good 
corporate governance (Z).  
Hypothesis testing is done after the data has passed the classic assumption test and data normality. In this 
study multiple linear regression equations use Stata as the analytical tool. The results of the analysis are 
shown in the following table: 
 
Table-2. Result of linear regression analysis. 
Source SS df MS Number of obs  =       145 
Model 195.85006 5 39.1700119 F(5, 139)      =     25.49 
Residual 213.594149 139 1.53664856 
 
Prob > F       =    0.0000 
R-squared      =    0.4783 
 
Total 
 
409.444209 
 
144 
 
2.84336256 
Adj R-squared  =    0.4596 
Root MSE       =    1.2396 
 
cie Coef. Std. Err. t P> |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
qfr 
ti 
gcg 
gcgqfr 
gcgti 
_cons 
.3100969 
14.85188 
-37.73095 
1.373633 
-36.99373 
15.06109 
.2513793 
7.593524 
16.52283 
.5803514 
18.9819 
7.203728 
1.23 
1.96 
-2.28 
2.37 
-1.95 
2.09 
0.219 
0.052 
0.024 
0.019 
0.053 
0.038 
-.1869246 
-.1618713 
-70.39952 
.2261747 
-74.52431 
.8180416 
.8071184 
29.86562 
-5.062373 
2.52109 
.5368553 
29.30414 
               Source: Results of stata data processing, 2019. 
 
4.3. Effect of Quality of financial reporting on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
The results of testing the regression model in this study include the quality of financial reporting 
variables on the corporate investment efficiency, indicating the probability of error rates that are greater than 
the expected level of significance. The results of the data show a value of 0.219 or greater than 0.05. So that 
the quality of financial reporting has no influence on corporate investment efficiency in manufacturing 
companies in 2013 - 2017.  
The results of this study are not in line with the results of previous studies conducted by Lai et al. (2014) 
which states that efficient investment activities can be increased if, between quality of financial reporting and 
investment efficiency is positively related. Thus H1 is refused to show that there are still many investors who 
see other factors for investment, not only seen from the company's financial statements. 
 
4.4. Effect of Tax Incentives on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
The results of testing the regression model of the tax incentives variable on the corporate investment 
efficiency show that the error rate is greater than the expected level of significance. The results of the data 
show a value of 0.052 or greater than 0.05, which means H2 is rejected and tax incentives have proven to have 
no effect on corporate investment efficiency. 
 The results of this study are in line with previous studies conducted by Lumbantobing (2008) which 
showed that the incentive tax policy was not significantly related to climate investment of foreign investment 
companies in the textile industry in Indonesia. 
 
4.5. Effect of Good Corporate Governance on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
The measurement of the variables of good corporate governance on corporate investment efficiency shows 
an error rate that is smaller than the expected level of significance. The measurement results of this variable 
show a value of -0.024 or smaller than 0.05, but experience anomaly, because the effect coefficient is negative. 
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The hypothesis of this study is in the same direction, that is positive influence, so that H3 is rejected and there 
is a negative effect of good corporate governance on corporate investment efficiency. The results of this study 
complement the previous research conducted by Houcine (2013) who found several factors that could affect 
companies to be able to invest efficiently, including: the size of the audit committee, independent board of 
commissioners, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership. 
 
4.6. Moderation of Good Corporate Governance on the Effect of Quality of financial reporting on Corporate Investment 
Efficiency 
The testing of this hypothesis measures the moderation of good corporate governance on the influence of 
the quality of financial reporting on corporate investment efficiency, indicating the probability of error rates 
that are smaller than the expected level of significance (0.0% <5%), the results of the data show a value of 
0.019 or smaller from 0.05, which means that H4 is accepted and the moderation of good corporate governance 
is able to strengthen the influence of quality of financial reporting on corporate investment efficiency. The 
results of this study are in line with the results of Oktadella (2011) which shows the results that institutional 
ownership, audit committees, and independent commissioners have a positive and significant influence on the 
integrity of financial statements. 
 
4.7. Moderation of Good Corporate Governance on the Effect of Tax Incentives on Corporate Investment Efficiency 
Tests on this hypothesis measuring the moderation of good corporate governance on the influence of tax 
incentives on corporate investment efficiency show that the probability of error rates is greater than the 
expected significance level (0.0%> 5%), the results of the data show a value of 0.053 or greater than 0 , 05 
which means H5 is rejected and moderation of good corporate governance is not able to strengthen the 
influence of tax incentives on corporate investment efficiency.  
The results of this study are not in line with the results of the research of Hanum and Zulaikha (2013) 
which explains the existence of independent commissioners (supervisors) in every formulation of company 
strategies carried out by the board of commissioners (supervisors) and company management (decision 
makers) and stakeholders will guarantee results effective and efficient policies included in tax planning that 
have an impact on the magnitude of the effective tax rate of the company. This result means that there are still 
many companies that do not apply GCG to management to take a company policy. 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study has a very meaningful conclusion, namely the role of good corporate governance that is able to 
strengthen the influence of the quality of financial reporting on corporate investment efficiency. Individual 
quality of financial reporting is not able to influence corporate investment efficiency. However, good corporate 
governance is able to moderate its impact to be significant for corporate investment efficiency. This can be 
interpreted that the quality of financial reporting is very dependent on good corporate governance that is 
implemented.  
Quality of financial reporting will have a positive impact if it is supported by more and more independent 
commissioners. Meanwhile, tax incentives do not affect corporate investment efficiency. This can be 
interpreted that the tax incentives provided have not been able to increase the issuer's income, to support the 
achievement of investment efficiency. Then good corporate governance has a negative effect on corporate 
investment efficiency. 
 The existence of independent commissioners as a measure of good corporate governance does not focus 
on increasing issuer's income, focusing more on improving quality of financial reporting, considering that 
independent commissioners are commissioners who have qualifications in accounting. Furthermore, good 
corporate governance is not able to strengthen the influence of tax incentives towards corporate investment 
efficiency.  
Based on the conclusions and limitations above, some suggestions can be given. The number of 
commissioners can be increased if you want to improve the quality of financial reporting. For further research, 
it is expected to use another proxy in the measurement of Good corporate governance. For investors, it is 
expected to pay attention to the quality of financial reporting presented by the company in the financial 
statements to see the sales growth and total assets owned by the company from year to year. For company 
management, it is expected to further enhance good corporate governance by increasing the independence of 
the commissioners so that there is no intervention from one of the parties. This can improve the welfare of all 
internal and external parties that will affect the survival of the company. 
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